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CAN A MURDERER ACQUIRE TITLE BY HIS
CRIME AND KEEP IT?
"It is idle to say that the distinction between legal and
equitable actions has been wiped out by the modem practice.
It is true that all actions must be commenced in the same
way . . . and that both kinds of action are triable in the same

courts. But the distinction between legal and equitable
actions is as fundamental as that between actions ex contractu
and ex dedicto, and no legislative fiat can wipe it 6ut."
This statement of Mr. Justice Earl' as to the effect of the
modem codes of procedure is supported by many similar
observations by other judges,' and its truth will hardly be
questioned by any thoughtful lawyer. The codes have, however, wrought many changes in the old terminology, and have
broken away from certain traditions, which served as a constant reminder of the distinction between law and equity.
One who seeks equitable relief no longer begins a suit in
equity, but an action, and, if successful, obtains not a decree
but a judgment. The bill in equity and the declaration at
I2 Gould v. Cayuga Bank, 86 N. Y. 75, 83.
See, for example, DeWitt v. Hays,

2

Cal. 463, 469; Reubens v. Joel,

13 N. Y. 488, 493; Matthews v. McPherson, 65 N. Ca. i89, 191; Kahn v.
Old Telegraph Co., 2 Utah, 174, 194; Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 29 Wis.
245, 250.
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law have both been replaced by the complaint, or, in some
States, the petition. The defendant's pleading is never a plea,
but an answer, regardless of the relief sought by the complainant. There are no more chancellors and common law
judges; courts of equity and common law courts have disappeared, and there is no further issue of common law reports and
chancery reports. In their stead we have simply judges,
courts of law and law reports. These changes are commonly
thought to have been beneficial. But with the disappearance
of the old, every-day terms, which constantly suggested the
difference between law and equity, there is danger that the
distinction itself may be undervalued or overlooked. In truth,
just because of this danger, it is even more important now
than it was formerly to emphasize the true significance of the
essential and permanent difference between legal and equitable
relief. For the distinction between a judgment that the plaintiff
recover land, chattels or money, and a judgment that the
defendant do or refrain from doing a certain thing, is as vital
and far-reaching as ever. In other words, the courts still act
sometimes in rem, as at common law, and sometimes in personam, as in equity.
An excellent illustration of the importance of discriminating
between relief in rem and relief in personam is to be found in
the arguments of counsel and the opinions of the judges in
dealing with several recent cases, in which one person killed
another in order to acquire, by descent or devise, the property
of his victim. By a strange chance there have been seven of
these cases reported in the last nine years. In four of them
the murderer was successful in securing and holding the property ; in two others his purpose was defeated, as it would have
been in the remaining case, if the complaint had been properly
drawn. But in all the cases, with one exception, even in those
in which the right result is reached, the reasoning is in the
highest degree unsatisfactory.
There are three possible views as to the legal effect of the
murder upon the title to the property of the deceased:
I. The legal title does not pass to the murderer as heir or
devisee.
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2. The legal title passes to the murderer, and he may
retain it in spite of his crime.
3. The legal title passes to the murderer, but equity will
treat him as a constructive trustee of the title because of the
unconscionable mode of its acquisition, and compel him to
convey it to the heirs ofthe deceased, exclusive of the murderer.
Each of these views has been adopted in one or more of the
cases. The first view was made the ratio deddendi in
Riggs v. Palmer 1 (1889), in Shellenberger v. Ransom 2 (1891),
and in McKinnon v. Lundy3 (1893-1895). In Riggsv. Palmer
a lad of sixteen killed his grandfather to prevent the latter
from revoking a will in which he was the principal devisee.
The words of the New York Statute of Wills are. "No will
in writing, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned, nor any
part thereof, shall be revoked or altered otherwise," etc. And
there is no mention in the statute of the case of the murder of
the testator by a beneficiary under the will. In Skellenberger
v. Ransom, a father murdered his daughter that he might
inherit her lands, and, being arrested, conveyed his interest in
the lands to his attorney to secure his services in defending
him. By the Nebraska Statute of Descents: "When any
person shall die stized of lands . . . they shall descend in the
manner following . . . second . . . if he shall have no issue
or widow his estate shall descend to his father."
It seems impossible to justify the reasoning of the court in
these cases. In the case of the devise, if the legal title did not
pass to the devisee, it must be because the testator's will was
revoked by the crime of his grandson. But when the Legislature has enacted that no will shall be revoked except in
certain specified modes, by what right can the court declare a
will revoked by some other mode? In the case of inheritance,
surely, the court cannot lawfully say that the title does not
descend, when the statute, the supreme law, says that it shall
descend. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that both the
New York and the Nebraska courts have abandoned their
untenable position.

1115 N. Y. 506.
231 Neb. 61.
Ont. . 1.32; 2r Ont. Ap. 56o; 24 Can. S. C. R. 65o.
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In Ellerson v. Westcott,' (1896), it was said that Riggs v.
Palmer must not be interpreted as deciding that the grandfather's will was revoked. On the contrary, the devise took
effect and transferred the legal title to the grandson. But the
court, acting as a court of equity, compelled the criminal to
surrender his ill-gotten title to the other heirs of the deceased.
In other words, the third of the three views before stated is
now recognized as law in New York.
Upon a rehearing of Sellenberger v. Ransom,2 the court
pronounced their former opinion erroneous, and finally decided,
adopting the second of the three views before stated, that the
father and his grantee, although a purchaser with notice,
acquired an indefeasible title to the property of his murdered
daughter. This second view was adopted also in Owens v.
Owens 3 (1888), where a woman, an accessory before the fact
to the murder of her husband, secured her dower; in Deem
v. Miliken4 (I892), where a son murdered his mother and inherited her property; and in Carpenter'sEstate5 (i 895), where
a son inherited from his father whom he had killed. This
view was approved also, extra-judicially, in Holdom v. Ancient
Order 6 (1896). In the light of these authorities the view that
the legal title does not pass to the murderer as heir or devisee
of his victim, being unsound in principle and unlikely to have
1148 N. Y. 149.
241

Neb. 631.

A short criticism of the reasoning in Riggs v. Palmer

and Shellenberger v. Ransom, on the grounds more fully set forth in this
article, appeared in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 394. In a letter to the editors of that
Review the counsel for the murderer in the Nebraska case said that his
success in obtaining a rehearing was in large measure due to this criticism.
Unfortunately the second opinion was more unsatisfactory than the first.
Fo, although both disregarded legal principles, the first was against,
while the second was in favor of the murderer.
3 ioo N. C. 240.
46 Ohio C. C. 357.
5 170 Pa. 203. WiLLIA s, J. dissented, saying: "The son could not
by his own felony acquire the property of his father and be protected by
the law in the possession of the fruits of his crime."
6159 Ill. 619. See editorial comments to the same effect in this Rezdew,
Vol. 34, N. S., p. 636 ; and in 29 C. L. J. 461 ; 32 C. L. J. 337 ; 34C. L. J.
247 ; 39 C. I4. J. 217 ; 41 C. L.J. 377. But, the statement in 42 C. I. J.
I33,of the later New York doctrine without adverse criticism is certainly
noticeable.
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any foTlowing in the future, may be dismissed from further
consideration?
The res, then, passing to the criminal, we have only to ask
whether he may keep it in spite of his crime, or whether,
because of his crime, he must surrender it to the other heirs
-ofthe deceased. If the first of these alternatives is the correct
one, then is our law open to the reproach of permitting the
-fagrant injustice of an atrocious criminal enriching himself by
his crime. If, on the other hand, the second alternative is
adopted, it follows that the decisions in Nebraska, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are erroneous. To the
writer it seems clear that these decisions are erroneous, and
that the error is due to a failure to discriminate between legal
and equitable relieE Both counsel and court appear to have
.assumed that the only question before them was whether the
criminal could take the title to the property of his victim-a
purely common-law question. One and all overlooked that
beneficent principle in our law by which Equity, acting in
personam, compels one, who, by misconduct has acquired a
res at common law, to hold the res as a constructive trustee
for the person wronged, or if he be dead, for his representatives. The true principle is put very clearly by Andrews, C. J.,
in Allerson v. Westcott,2 the latest of the decisions on the point
IAs far back as the time of Lord Hale, in King's Attorney v. Sands,
Freem. C. C. 129, Hardres, 405, 488 s. c.,an authority not cited in any
-of the recent cases, it was taken for granted by counsel and court that
the interest of a cesti2 que trust descended to his only brother, who had
killed him. The brother being attainted of murder and therefore having
no heirs, the trust was claimed by the Crown, as feudal lord. The claim
was not allowed, as there was no escheat of equitable interests, but there
being no one who could enforce the trust, the trustee, who was the father
of the two brothers, held the legal title for his own benefit.
By the civil law, too, as is pointed out by Mr. F. B. Williams, in 8
Harv. L. Rev. 170-17r, the legal title passed to the criminal and was
afterwards taken from him.
Should the question arise again in Canada, it is highly probable that
McKinnon v. Lundy, in which a husband killed his wife, who had made
her will in his favor, would be supported on the ground that the husband
became a constructive trustee for the heirs. The action, as in Riggs v.
Palmer, was for equitable relief.
2 r48 N. Y. 149, 154.
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under discussion: "The relief which may be obtained against:
her (the murderess and devisee) is equitable and injunctive.
The court in a proper action will, by forbidding the enforce-

ment of a civil right, prevent her from enjoying the fruits of
her iniquity. It will not and cannot set aside the will. That
is valid, but it will act upon facts arising subsequent to its
execution and deprive her of the use of the property."'
That there was no mention of this principle in the similar
cases that preceded Ellerson v. Westcott is the more remarkable, because the distinction here insisted upon, that a personmay acquire by force of the common law or by a statute alegal title, and yet be deprived of the beneficial interest in the
property by reason of his unconscionable conduct in its.
acquisition, has been repeatedly recognized and enforced.
E. g., If a grantor has executed a deed, knowing its nature,
the deed is effective to pass the title at law, even though he
was induced to execute it by the fraudulent representations ofthe grantee. Accordingly, the fraudulent grantee may, it, the:
absence of a statute allowing equitable defences, maintain.
ejectment against the grantor, the innocent victim of his
fraud
But the right of the defrauded grantee to relief in
equity was recognized in several of the cases just cited, and.
also, notably, in Blackwood v. Gregg,3 and it is, of course,.
every day's practice for a court of equity to treat a fraudulent
grantee as a constructive trustee.
I See the similar remarks of Maclennan,

J. A., in McKinnon v. Lundy,
Ont. App. 56o, 567: " One can easily understand that in the case of a
murder committed with the very object of getting property of the deceased.
by will or intestacy, the court could defeat that object, even by taking
away from the criminal a legal title acquired by such means; and it may
be that the court would go further and take the legal title away, even.
though the crime were committed without that object."
This view finds further confirmation in the opinion of Fry, L. J., in
Cleaver v. Mut. Association '92, 1 Q. B. 147, I58. See also 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 394; 25 Ir. L. Times, 423; 29 Ir. L. Times, 66; 91 L. Times, 261;
30 Am. L. Rev. I3O; 6 Green Bag, 534.
'Feret v. Hill, 15 C. B. 207; Mordecai v. Tankersley, i Ala. ioo;
Thomas v. Thomas, i Litt. (Ky.) 62; Jackson v. Hills, 8 Cow. 290;
Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, 513; Kahn v. Old Tel. Co., 2 Utah, 174;
Taylor v. King, 6 Munf. 358; Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486.
3
Hayes, 277, 3o3-3o6.
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What is true of fraud is equally true of duress practised by
'the grantee upon the grantor. The grantee gets the legal
-title to the res, but equity gives the grantor a right in personam,
and thus makes the grantee a trustee e.x maleficio. But the
grantor's right, being merely equitable, is lost, if the res is
-transferred to a bonafide purchaser.'
Fraud and force may be practised not only to procure the
execution of a conveyance, but also to prevent the making of
a conveyance. In such a case the unexecuted intention of the
victim of the fraud or force must at common law count for
nothing. The legal title must go just as it would, if the owner
of the res had never intended to convey it. But here, too,
equity will see that the wrong doer or anyone claiming under
him, except a purchaser for value without notice, does not
profit by his wrong, and will compel him to convey the legal
title in such manner as to effectuate the defeated intention of
his victim. A clear and cogent authority upon this point is
Lord Thurlow's decision in Luttrell v. Ohnius, which is thus
stated by Lord Eldon, and with his approval, in I I Ves. 63 8:
"Lord Waltham, tenant in tail, meaning to suffer a recovery,
.and by will to give real interests to his wife, Mr. Luttrell, who
by his marriage had an interest to prevent barring the entail,
did by force and management prevent the testator from signing the deed to make the tenant to the precipe: Lord Thurlow's opinion was clear, that though at law Mr. Luttrell's lady
was tenant in tail, and, which makes it stronger, she was no
party to the transaction, yet neither he nor anyone else could
have the benefit of that fraud, and the jury upon an issue
directed, having found that the recovery was fraudulently prevented, Lord Thurlow held, even in favor of a volunteer, that
.the tenant in tail should not take advantage of the iniquitous
act, though she was not a party to it; and the estate was considered exactly as if a recovery had been suffered,"'

19
Harv. L. Rev. 57, 8.
2

Lord ldon, stating this case a second time in 14 Ves.

290,

said

"Luttrell had, while Lord Waltham was upon his deathbed, engaged in
suffering a recovery, prevented it, with the view that the estate should
-devolve upon the person with whom he was connected (his wife). That
,estate was by law vested in that individual, a much stronger case, there-
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Lord Thurlow applied the same principle in Dixon v. Olmius,'
overruling the demurrer of Lord Waltham's heir, who, by
several acts of fraud and violence, prevented the republication,
of his ancestor's will. This case, too, was approved by Lord.
Eldon, who said in Middleton v. Zlddleton -' "If a person be.
fraudently prevented from doing an act, this court will consider it as if that act had been done, as in the case of Lord,
Waltham's will."
As an heir may by fraud or violence pre~Vent the execution,
of a will, so a devisee may, by the same rnleans, prevent the,
revocation of a will. The governing principle in such a caseis admirably stated by Boyd, C. J., in Gaines v. Gaines:3 "A
devisee, who by fraud or force prevents the revocation of a
will, may, in a court of equity, be considered as a trustee for
those who would be entitled to the estate in case it were
revoked; but the question cannot with propriety be made in a
case of this kind, where the application is to admit the will to
record."4 The learned reader will at once appreciate the
closeness of the analogy between these cases of fraud upon a
a testator or ancestor, and the cases where the testator or
ancestor was killed. If the heir or devisee who gains the
legal title by fraud must hold it as a constructive trustee, a
forwio, should the same be true of one who Iacquires the legal
title by a revolting crime.
But there are other instances where a legal title or right
has been held to pass by force of a statute to a person notwithstanding his misconduct, but where a court of equity has
defeated his unjust scheme by compelling him to surrender"
the res to the person wronged.
fore, than the acquisition of property through imposition. Lord Thurlow . . . had no doubt that it was against conscience that one person
should hold a benefit which he had derived through the fraud of another."
I i Cox Eq. 414.
21
32

Jac. & W. 94, 96.
A. K. Marsh, 191.

'See to the same effect, Graham v. Burch, 53 Minn. 17 (semble);
Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 (sevible); 2 Roberts, Wills (3d Ed.),
3.
The decision to the contrary in Kent v. Mahaffy, IO Ohio St. 204, it
is submitted, is not to be supported. In Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. 25,.
the equitable aspect of the question was not discussed.
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By Statute 7 Anne, C. 20, 91, all unregistered conveyances
are to be adjudged fraudulent and void against subsequent
purchasers for valuable consideration. In Doe v. Alsopp,l a
grantee who failed to register his deed was defendant in an
ejectment brought by a second grantee who bought with
notice of the prior unregistered conveyance. It was argued
for the defendant that the object of the statute was to protect
innocent purchasers only, and the court was asked to read
into the statute an exception excluding from its operation
those who sought to derive from it an unconscionable advantage. But the judges declined to legislate, saying that plainer
words could not be used and that sitting in a court of law
they were to give effect to them, and suggesting that the
defendant's relief must be sought in equity. And courts of
equity have regularly given relief in such cases by treating
the second grantee as a constructive trustee for the first
In Greaves v. Tofield,3 James L. J. says: "Lord Eldon
pointed out that there was no altering the language of *the
Acts of Parliament, there was no dealing with or in any way
repealing the Acts of Parliament directly or indirectly, but
giving the acts their full force, that is to say, leaving the estate
to go in priority to the man who had registered, still- if that
man had notice of anything by which his vendor or his grantor
had bound himself, he was bound by it.4
Again by Mo. Rev. St. § 2689, "The homestead of every
housekeeper shall be .exempt from attachment and execution."
5
In the singular case of Foxy. Hubbard,
a decree had been made
for a sale under foreclosure of a mortgage covering a house
and land; before the sale the house was wrongfully removed to
an adjoining lot by the owner of this lot, who at once set up
housekeeping in the house. The purchaser at the foreclosure
sale bought in ignorance of the removal of the house. The
15 B. & Al. 142.
2 Le Neve v. Le Neve, I Ves. 64, Amb. 436, 3 Atk. 646, s. c., approved
by Lord Eldon in Davis v. Strathmore, i6 Ves. 416, 427.
314 Ch. Div. 563.
4See also i Pomeroy, Eq. Jur.
430, 431 ; 2 W. & T. L. C. in Eq.
(Am. Ed.) 2r4; Britton's App. 45 Pa. 172.
679 Mo. 390.

CAN A MURDERER

ACQUIRE TITLE

house, of course, could not be recovered in specie, for it had
become a part of the wrongdoer's realty. It was conceded that
the purchaser had an action of tort against the wrong-doer,
but the latter was insolvent and insisted on his statutory homestead exemption in his new home. Accordingly, as the court
stated, there was no remedy for the purchaser at law. An
exception could not be added to the statute, even against a
tort-feasor. But giving full effect to the statute, the court
decreed that the wrong doer must hold the homestead subject
to a lien in equity to the extent of the value of the house
removed.
Another illustration is suggested by Vane v. Vane.' The
plaintiff was the true owner of certain land, but was led by the
fraudulent representations of the defendant to suppose that he
was not the owner, and accordingly suffered the defendant to
occupy adversely for more than twenty years. This adverse
possession cut off the plaintiff's right of entry and action, and
by force of the statute, vested the title in the adverse possessor.
But the defendant, because of the fraud in securing his statutory title, was required by equity to reconvey the property to
the plaintiff This decision, it should be said, was made under
Section 26 of the Statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, which
expressly authorized a bill in equity in such a case. But
there seems to be no reason why a court of equity might not
accomplish the same result without an express statutory
provision. Suppose, for example, that the defendant surreptiously took the plaintiff's watch, and has concealed his
possession of it from the owner for six years. By force of the
statute the defendant's possession is unassailable at common
law, and the wrongful possessor has now become the legal
owner. But why may not Equity treat him as a trustee ? If
he had gained the legal title by fraudulently inducing the
plaintiff to transfer it to him, he would clearly be a trustee for
the plaintiff What difference can it make to a court of equity
whether the legal title came to the defendant through the act
'8 Ch. 383.
2 3 Ha-v. L. Rev. 321,

322.

BY HIS CRIME AND

KEEP IT?

of the plaintiff, or by operation of law, if in each case he
acquired it as the direct consequence of his fraud.1
These illustrations, drawn from the misuse of the Statute of
Limitations, the Homestead Exemption Statute and the
Recording Acts, and from the use of fraud or duress against
an ancestor or testator, are obviously governed by the common principle that one shall not be allowed "to enjoy the
fruits of his iniquity." Surely murder is iniquity within this
principle. Every one must agree with the following statement of Fry, L. J., in Cleaver v. Mutual Association :' " It
appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason
include amongst the rights, which it enforces, rights directly
resulting to the person asserting them from the crime of that
person. If no action can arise from fraud, it seems impossible
to suppose that it can arise from felony or misdemeanor."
The case from which the remarks of the distinguished Lord
Justice are taken, while resembling the American cases where
a murderer sought to profit by his crime, suggests certain
distinctions. The facts ofthe case were these: James Maybrick
had insured his life in favor of Florence Maybrick, his wife.
Mrs. Maybrick was afterwards convicted of the murder of her
husband, but the sentence of death was commuted to penal
servitude for life. The insurance money was claimed by Mrs.
Maybrick's assignee and also by the executors of James
Maybrick. The insurance company insisted that the policy
was not enforceable by either claimant. Under St. 45 & 46
Vict. c. 75, § II,James Maybrick was made a trustee of the
I There are many conflicting decisions upon the question whether a
fraudulent concealment of a cause of action in contract or tort for
damages, will suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations. This
conflict is surprising, in view of the explicit words of the Statute: "No
action shall be brought unless within six (or other fixed number of)
years." But here, too, though the right on the old cause of action at law
is barred, equity might well give relief. By fraudulently barring the
plaintiff's action, the defendant would unjustly enrich himself by keeping for himself what he ought to have paid to the plaintiff. A court of
equity should not hesitate to make the defendant surrender this unjust
enrichment to the plaintiff. The case would seem to fall within the
general principle of quasi-contracts.
2 1892, I Q. B. 147.
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policy for his wife. But this statute also provided that the
moneys payable under the policy should not, "so long as any
object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the
estate of the insured." The wife, therefore, was not the sole
cestui que trust of the policy. As the court said, it was a
necessary implication, that, if the wife died before her husband,
the insurance money would form part of his estate. The
court decided, first, that it was against ptiblic policy for Mrs.
Maybrick, or her assignee, to enforce the trust because of her
crime; and, secondly, that under the statute the result must
be the same whether the performance of the trust for the wife
was rendered impossible by her premature death or by public
policy. In either case the contingent resulting trust in favor
of the insured took effect, and therefore the executors of James
Maybrick were entitled to the moneys payable under the
policy.
The judges intimated that their decision would have been
the same, even in the absence of any statute. Mrs. Maybrick
would not then have been a cestui que trust of the policy, nor,
as payee in a contract between the insurer and the insured,
would she have had any valid claim under the policy. For,
by the English law, only the promisee has rights under a contract, even though it purports to be for the benefit of a third
person. In many of the states in this country, on the other
hand, the interest in a life insurance policy is vested exclusively and irrevocably in the beneficiary, passing to his
representative, if he die in the lifetime of the insured, and
enforceable by the beneficiary or his representative by an
action at law. How, in one of these states, are the rights of
the parties to be adjusted, if the beneficiary killed the insured?
The criminal beneficiary would, doubtless, be precluded
from recovering the insurance money by the same principle of
public policy that defeated the claim of Mrs. Maybrick. On
the other hand, it is difficult to find any warrant for saying
that the amount of the policy forms part of the estate of the
insured. The latter has no contingent resulting interest in the
policy. The interest of the beneficiary may have arisen by the
gift of the insured, but the gift was complete and irrevocable,
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and the conclusion seems inevitable that the insurer is relieved
of all liability.
The necessity of a similar conclusion will be more apparent
in another case that may be put. The payee of a negotiable
note, payable ten days after the death of the maker's father,
*indorses it to A. for value. The indorsee kills the father. As
before, public policy prevents a recovery by the criminal against
the maker or indorser. And surely the payee, who has already
had the value of the note from the indorsee, cannot receive it
again from the maker. The latter profits, not by any merit of
his own, but, as obligors frequently profit, by the application
of the maxim, Ex turpicausa non arituractio.
With the instances just considered may be contrasted another
possible case, suggested by Lord Justice Fry's opinion in the
Maybrick case. Suppose land is sold to B. and C., and the
conveyance made to B. for life, with remainder in fee to C.
C. kills B. How will the murder affect the rights of the
parties in the property? B.'s life estate being terminated by
his death, C. becomes at law the absolute owner of the land.
Will Equity make him hold his fee simple as a constructive
trustee? If so, for whom ? Certainly not for the seller, for
he, having received the price of the land, has no concern with
its subsequent history. Nor should C. be made a constructive
trustee of the entire estate for the benefit of B. ; for that would
make C. forfeit his remainder which he acquired independently
of his crime. It is not the function of Equity to administer
the penal law, but to secure restitution to a person wronged,
by compelling the wrongdoer to give up the profits of his misconduct. In the case supposed, C. took from B. no more than
the enjoyment of the estate during theyears he might have lived
but for C.'s crime. This, being the measure of C.'s unjust enrichment, should also be the extent of the constructive trust
against him. Perfect restitution in such a case is obviously
impossible, both because B. is dead and because it is impossible
to know how long he would have lived. We must be content
with the closest possible approximation to complete justice. As
restitution cannot be made to B., it must be made to him'who,
in matters of property, stands in his place-that is, his heir.
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And the amount of the restitution must be determined by estimating, according to the tables of mortality, how many years a
person of B.'s age would probably have lived. For the period
thus ascertained equity would require C. to hold the land as a
constructive trustee for B.'s heir.
Similar reasoning would be applicable if land bought by B.
and C. had been conveyed to them as joint tenants in fee
simple, and C.1were then to murder B. Each joint tenant has
a vested interest in a moiety of the land so long as he lives,
and a contingent right to the whole upon surviving his fellow.'
The vested interest of C., the murderer, cannot be taken from
him even by a court of equity. But C. having by his crime
taken away, B.'s vested interest must hold that as a constructive
trustee for the heir of B.; and, it being impossible to know
which of the two would have outlived the other, equity would
doubtless give the innocent victim the benefit of the doubt, as
against the wrong doer who had deprived him of his chance
of survivorship, and accordingly give the entire equitable
interest to B.'s heir upon C.'s death.
The results reached in these cases must commend themselves to everyone's sense of justice. But all will admit that
these results could not be accomplished by common-law principles alone. The common law would make the criminal
remainderman in the one case, and the criminal joint tenant
in the other case, the absolute owner of the land. Equity
alone, by acting in personam, can compel the criminal to surrender what, in spite of his crime, the common law has suffered
him to acquire. It is much to be regretted that counsel did
not invoke, and that the courts of Nebraska, North Carolina,
Ohio and Pennsylvania did not apply, in the cases recently
before them, the sound principle of equity, that a murderer or
other wrong doer shall not enrich himself by his iniquity at
the expense of an innocent person.
James Barr Ames.
Cambridge, April z.5, z897.

